IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, STATE OF FLORIDA CIVIL DIVISION CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY FLAG SERVICE ORGANIZATION, INC. Plaintiff, v. CASE NO.: 00-002750-CI-20 DELL LIEBREICH, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Lisa McPherson; ROBERT MINTON; THE LISA MCPHERSON TRUST; DANDAR & DANDAR, P.A., and KENNAN G. DANDAR, Defendants. __________________________________/ PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE OFFERED POST TRIAL IN DANDAR'S CLOSING BRIEF PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Over 80% of Dandar's post-hearing brief, and virtually the entirety of his appendices, address evidence never put before this Court during these hearings. Plaintiff objects to this evidence in toto on the grounds that had it been presented during the hearings, plaintiff would have had an opportunity to address it and, as necessary, call witnesses to refute it. For example, if Dandar had timely disclosed that he intended to offer portions of Jesse Prince's testimony before Judge Schaeffer, plaintiff could have used those very portions to examine Prince while on the witness stand before this court and could have cross-examined him on the points contained therein. Similarly, had Dandar timely disclosed that he would offer Stacy Brooks' testimony before Judge Schaeffer, plaintiff could at least have asked Brooks to come to Florida to testify. Instead, plaintiff was deprived of any opportunity to meet or confront any of this evidence by Dandar's sandbagging tactics of waiting until after the close of the hearing, to debut the bulk of his evidence. Although at the end of the hearing Dandar told plaintiff and the court that he intended to offer testimony from certain identified witnesses, he has filed exhibits and even deposition transcripts from other cases, none of which Dandar ever presented to this court, and none of which Dandar ever advised the Court or plaintiff he would be offering. Accordingly, plaintiff objects generally to Dandar's post-hearing offer of any evidence not previously presented in this case. Beyond this general objection, plaintiff objects in particular that the evidence offered is hearsay, for which no exception applies, and much of it is inadmissible on the basis of other specific evidentiary objections addressed in detail below. I. THE TESTIMONY OFFERED IS HEARSAY TO WHICH NO EXCEPTION APPLIES Plaintiff objects to virtually all of the evidence Dandar offers from the hearing before Judge Schaeffer, as hearsay, and otherwise, on specific grounds. While the legal bases for most of these various objections are obvious, plaintiff addresses the reasons that the particular hearsay exceptions are inapplicable, as follows: 1. Former Testimony Dandar may be expected to protest that some of his proffered "evidence" comes in the form of former testimony, falling within the former testimony exception of § 90.804(2)(a) or as statements against interest under § 90.804(2)(c). Either way, those hearsay exceptions do not apply without Dandar showing the unavailability of the witness under § 90.804(1), something he has made no effort to do. The Florida standard for demonstrating witness unavailability is stringent: "If the attendance of the witness cannot be secured by subpoena, the proponent must attempt to secure the 'testimony' of the declarant. This provision [Fla. Stat. 90.804(1)(e)] means that the proponent must attempt to take the deposition of the declarant and if the proponent does so attempt and fails, the necessary 'unavailability' is present." Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence (2002), § 804.1, at pp. 859-860. Regardless of the opinions of a proponent as to the likelihood, or lack thereof, of a declarant's availability, the proponent absolutely must make affirmative efforts to obtain their testimony before he can avail himself of "witness unavailability." See Spicer v. Metro. Dade County, 458 So. 2d 792, 794-95 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1984) (declining to find unavailable a declarant who was "in the Federal Witness Protection Program at an undisclosable location in the United States," because the proponent did not "discharge its burden of establishing it had taken any reasonable steps to procure the witness's attendance."); Rivera v. Florida, 510 So.2d 340, 341 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1987) (declining to find a witness unavailable, despite threat from a co-defendant to kill the declarant if he appeared in court). Thus, to avail himself of the § 90.804(2) exceptions, Dandar would have had to demonstrate that the witness was unavailable and that he had made the requisite efforts to procure that witness's attendance. Dandar made no showing at the hearing that he tried to obtain the appearance of any witness not at the hearing. Thus, Florida law forecloses him from admitting any hearsay evidence through this exception. 2. Purported Prior Inconsistent Statements Offered to Impeach Are Inadmissible Dandar might also claim that some of his new "evidence" consists of prior inconsistent statements, admissible to impeach those witnesses who did appear before this court, such as Minton. However, Dandar failed to lay the proper foundation for availing himself of this exception. When an otherwise-hearsay statement is offered for impeachment, the witness on the stand must be confronted with the allegedly impeaching testimony and be given an opportunity to explain it. Kimble v. State, 537 So. 2d 1094, 1096 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1989) ("[T]o lay the proper predicate for impeachment by prior inconsistent statement, the witness must be advised of the substance of the prior inconsistent statement, the time and place the statement was made, and the person to whom the statement was made."); Irons v. State, 498 So. 2d 958, 959-60 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1986) (excluding testimony of multiple witnesses as to prior inconsistent statement by another witness, where that witness was not given an "opportunity to explain or deny"). As Professor Ehrhardt explains: Prior to counsel introducing any evidence of an inconsistent statement, the witness must first be afforded an opportunity to admit, explain or deny the prior statement. The witness should be asked whether he made the prior statement, with identification of the time, place, occasion and the person to whom it was made. When the statement is a written statement or an oral statement which has been reduced to writing, the court, upon motion of counsel, must order the statement be shown the witness or its contents disclosed to him. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence (2002), § 608.4, at p. 478 (emphasis added). By waiting not merely until Minton, Rosen and Garko were off the stand, but until after the end of the evidentiary hearing, Dandar has necessarily denied these witnesses any opportunity to "admit, explain or deny" statements attributed to him by others. Dandar has thus failed to lay the requisite foundation for the alleged prior inconsistent statements of Minton and others that litter his brief, which must therefore be excluded. 3. Purported Prior Inconsistent Statements Offered to Prove Truth of the Matter Asserted Are Inadmissible Had Dandar sought to rely on the provisions of § 801(2)(a), which permits prior sworn testimony to be admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, he would have found it similarly unhelpful. The very terms of that rule preclude its use for any of the "evidence" that Dandar now offers: (2) A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is: (a) Inconsistent with the declarant's prior testimony and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition § 801(2)(a) (emphasis added). Three portions of this rule deny any use of it to Dandar. First, the requirement that the statement must have been made "under oath" means that any out-of-court statements offered, including those relayed through another declarant who was under oath, are not admissible under this rule. Second, the requirement that the "declarant testif[y] at the trial or hearing" precludes this rule's use to admit any testimony from anyone not a witness in this hearing. Third, and most importantly, the rule requires that the declarant be "subject to cross-examination concerning the statement." Since Dandar did not present any of his new evidence at the hearing, while some of the declarants might have been cross-examined but instead waited until after the end of the hearing and the declarants are no longer subject to cross-examination, this rule can be of no use to him. None of Dandar's otherwise inadmissible evidence may be brought in under this provision. 4. Admission of a Party Dandar may have tried to argue that at least Minton's prior statements may come in as admissions of a party, as per § 90.803(18). Any such reliance on the party admission exception would be misplaced for two related but distinct reasons. First, Minton is not a "party" to the disqualification proceeding, despite his involvement in the substantive, underlying case. He has no legally-cognizable interest in whether Dandar remains as counsel for the Estate; having "no dog in this fight," he is not a party to it. The principle that one may be a party to a case but not be a party to a particular dispute within that case is one this court itself recognized during the April 9, 2002, continuation of the contempt hearing against Minton, when it ruled that Thomas Dandar could not cross-examine Minton on his recantation testimony because Dandar and his client, the estate, while defendants in this action, were not parties to the contempt proceeding, a matter solely between Minton and plaintiff. (Ex. 1, April 9, Tr., p. 26.) This same principle applies here where Minton, while a party to the underlying case, is not a party to the disqualification hearing; thus, his out-of-court statements are not "admissions" of a party. See Penabad v. A. G. Gladstone Assoc., Inc., 2002 WL 1285340 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2002), reconsideration denied Aug. 21, 2002 (finding that named plaintiff in underlying matter was not a party to subsidiary lis pendens proceeding). Furthermore, the "party admission" exception to hearsay, embodied in § 90.803 has another limitation. The rule requires that the statement be "offered against a party." Not only is Minton not a "party" to this matter as explained above, but Dandar's newly submitted "evidence" is not being offered "against" Minton. Minton has no stake in the outcome of this disqualification proceeding. Nothing can be done for, to, or "against" him within its confines. In particular, statements cannot be offered against him, because he has no legal position in this hearing "against" which they might be set. Accordingly, § 803(18) is just as unavailing to Dandar as any of the other hearsay exceptions. II. PARTICULAR WITNESSES For the reasons set forth above, and in the list of objections below, Dandar cannot introduce any evidence that was not presented in this court. Despite the multiple valid objections to Dandar's new "evidence," objections that should have been obvious to him, Dandar tried to introduce hearsay statements from numerous witnesses. While the objections explained above and listed below stand on their own, complete exclusion of the testimony of specific witnesses is appropriate, as follows. 1. Minton and Rosen While it is of no evidentiary significance, Dandar cannot claim that the Minton testimony he now offers is new matter that he did not have when Minton was on the stand here in April. First, much of the Minton testimony before Judge Schaeffer that Dandar now offers is right out of Minton's, pre-April, 2002, deposition testimony. Second, Dandar certainly cannot claim that he was surprised by the Minton testimony before Judge Schaeffer, because he could have, but chose not to, question Minton on cross-examination before this Court so as to elicit that very testimony. Third, Dandar could certainly have called Minton as an adverse witness and questioned him on any relevant issue. Dandar held back the Minton statements he now tries to introduce for the obvious reason that he wished to deny Minton the right to explain those statements. Dandar also surely wished to prevent plaintiff from cross-examining Minton on these issues. In these circumstances, however, neither Minton's pre-April 9, 2002, deposition testimony nor his trial testimony before Judge Schaeffer may be used now, after Minton has left the stand. See Kimble, 537 So.2d at 1096; Irons, 498 So.2d at 954-60. Moreover, certain of the testimony from Judge Schaeffer's hearing (i.e., Minton, Leipold, Yingling) is offered by Dandar solely to impeach Minton and Rosen, who appeared before this court, as to what occurred at the March 29-30 settlement meetings in New York. This is improper for several reasons. First, Dandar had every opportunity to examine and attempt to impeach Minton and Rosen on the events at that meeting when they testified here. It is, therefore, particularly inappropriate for Dandar to now offer allegedly impeaching evidence from Judge Schaeffer's hearing that he never confronted Minton or Rosen with in this hearing. It is black letter law that no witness may be impeached through the testimony of other witnesses on a collateral matter. See, e.g., Faucher v. R.C.F Developers, 569 So.2d 794, 804 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (overruled on other grounds, Ullman v. City of Tampa Parks Dept., 625 So.2d 868 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)) ("The law is well settled that it is improper to litigate purely collateral matters solely for the purpose of impeaching a party or witness. Once a question is put to the party or witness on a purely collateral matter ..., the proponent of the question is bound by the witnesses' answer; it is inappropriate to then try the truth or falsity of the answer on the collateral matter by adducing independent proof through other witnesses.") Even assuming, arguendo, that Dandar's baseless claims of threats, coercion and extortion practiced upon Minton are not collateral, the question of whether plaintiff's representatives insisted that Minton cause a termination of the wrongful death case (versus the testimony, including of Rosen, that it was strongly desired but not put forth as an absolute condition) is purely collateral. Even assuming a demand that Minton bring about an end to that case, that demand is not a "threat," "coercion" or "extortion." To be sure, one could expect and there might well be subtle differences between the recollections of six different people who attended the March 29-30 meetings, including differences in emphasis that Dandar tries to exploit, but at the end of the day, every single witness -- Minton, Brooks, Yingling, and Rosen -- testified unequivocally that there were no "threats", no "coercion," no "extortion" of Minton. Regardless, the "evidence" of collateral matters is entirely inadmissible for other reason, as listed below. 2. Brooks Stacy Brooks is not a party to this action, and therefore, there is no basis for offering any of her testimony as an "admission." Nothing in the portions of the Brooks testimony before Judge Schaeffer that Dandar offers here constitutes any "declaration against interest" by Brooks; she has made no statements offered by Dandar subjecting her to any potential liability. Brooks was in the courtroom throughout the April 9 and 19 hearings before this court and Dandar could have called her as a witness then or subpoenaed her to appear and testify at a later date. He did neither. Thus, for Dandar to now claim that he may offer Brooks' testimony before Judge Schaeffer on the grounds that she is now unavailable, would not be well taken. Her availability, as well as Dandar's failure to demonstrate that he took any efforts to secure her presence or deposition in this case, mean that none of her testimony is admissible under § 90.804(2)(a) or (c). 3. Alexander and Summers Peter Alexander and Teresa Summers are not parties hereto, and their proffered testimony therefore offers no "admissions"; nor does it offer any "declarations against interest." They are or were in Pinellas County and available to testify before this court. Each of these witnesses appeared and testified before Judge Schaeffer at Dandar's request, and he could have made that same request to them for the hearing before this court. Indeed, both Summers and Alexander were present in court during parts of the proceedings and communicating with Dandar and Mr. Lirot. It should also be noted that Mr. Lirot independently represents Alexander in this county (Ex. 9, Tr. of Proceedings, April 20, 2002, appearances page), and cannot claim unavailability. 4. Haney, Merrett, Oliver, Many, and Leipold Brian Haney, John Merrett, Frank Oliver, Nancy Many and Daniel Leipold, while living outside of Pinellas County, all voluntarily appeared and testified before Judge Schaeffer at Dandar's request. Indeed, Dandar himself recognized his problem when he made his comment to this court that Haney, Merrett, Leipold and Oliver are beyond this court's subpoena power (Ex. 10, August 29 Tr., pp. 209-210, 285-286; Ex. 11, August 30 Tr., pp. 503-504), but against Dandar's unsworn representations, the fact remains that each of these witnesses answered the summons and traveled here to testify before Judge Schaeffer when Dandar asked them to do so. Dandar presented no evidence, as required, that they would not have done so had he asked them to travel here again, nor did he present other evidence that he was unable to secure their attendance. Both Haney and Oliver have also been identified by Dandar as his consultants, are obviously under his control, and Oliver was present during some of the hearings. There is no basis to conclude that these witnesses would not have agreed to testify in person at these hearings and therefore, no basis to invoke the unavailability rule. Jones v. State, 678 So.2d 309, 313-314 (Fla. 1996) (requiring the party seeking to use "witness unavailability" exceptions to the hearsay prohibition to demonstrate that unavailability); Spicer v. Metro. Dade County, 458 So. 2d 792, 794-95 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1984) (finding that proponent's failure to make reasonable efforts to contact a witness in the Federal Witness Protection Program vitiated any claim to "witness unavailability"). 5. Pope and Yingling Although both attorneys Wally Pope and Monique Yingling were available to testify here, Dandar chose to not call them, but has instead offered their testimony before Judge Schaeffer, which constitutes inadmissible hearsay. Mr. Pope was present during all of the hearings. 6. Prince and Garko The wrongful death case testimony of Jesse Prince and Michael Garko that Dandar offers here is totally improper. Neither is a party, their testimony contains no "admissions" or "declarations against interest," and, most importantly, both appeared and testified here for Dandar at Dandar's request. Instead of eliciting from them on the witness stand whatever he wanted from their testimony before Judge Schaeffer, Dandar made a conscious decision to conduct only limited examinations of these two witnesses and now attempts to "supplement" the record with their earlier testimony before Judge Schaeffer. Not surprisingly, Dandar's brief offers not a single precedent, no case or rule of evidence, that allows him to offer the prior testimony of an available and testifying witness. III. PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS For the court's convenience, plaintiff here presents its objections in chart form, listing on the left hand side the disputed evidence offered by Dandar, as identified in his post-trial brief, and on the right hand side, identifying in shorthand the objections it has to each part of Dandar's evidence. As indicated above and in plaintiff's brief, plaintiff objects to the introduction of testimony imported from the wrongful death case, but as part of its "fairness" (completeness) objections, in the event it is permitted, here occasionally provides more complete testimony from that action.Brf Pg Evidence Objections 1 Pltf's Ex. 109-C, before Judge Schaeffer, Exhibit 8 herein, HCO Policy Letter of 15 August 1960. o Irrelevant and immaterial.o Not authenticated.o Not offered.o Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr. at 221-223). 6-7 Garko testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/11/02, Appendix 1, 116:2-10.Garko testified that Dandar did not tell Minton to lie in Garko's presence. o Hearsay.o Irrelevant and immaterial.o Improper comment on Dandar credibility. 10 Pope testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/17/02, Appendix 2, 43:5-13. Q Well, you just told me that if Mr. Rosen apparently told you to go ahead and file a motion to disqualify me, you didn't know what the facts were but you trusted he knew what the facts were?A You know, I suspect Mr. Rosen communicated to me the facts. But I honestly can't -- my -- my present recollection is that the full-blown facts came out at the hearing of the 9th. That is when I learned the meat on the bones. o Hearsay.o Irrelevant.Completeness Designation:Mr. Pope testified just before this, giving a further explanation. (Ex. 12, Pope testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/17/02, pp. 39-40) 14-16 Minton testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/28/02, Appendix 4, 1239:22-1240:8, 1240:17-1242:14. Minton testimony in the Schaeffer hearings relating to the timing of the meeting regarding the addition of David Miscavige. o Hearsay.o No foundation for impeachment. 16-17 Garko testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/11/02, Appendix 1, 12:7-12.A Okay. I would not consider it a meeting. And this is a different interaction than is outlined in Mr. Minton's affidavit. But present were myself, Mr. Dandar, Ms. Brooks and Mr. Minton. And Jesse Prince was not there, as alleged in Mr. -- in Mr. Minton's affidavit. o Hearsay. 20 Dandar testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/4/02, Appendix 5, 245:18-21.Q All right. Now, you testified earlier that you had zero meetings, as you define meetings, with Mr. Minton to discuss the case. Is that right?A That is right. o Hearsay.Completeness Designation:Dandar testified he had a very narrow definition of "meeting." (Ex. 13, Dandar testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/30/02, pp. 9-10; Ex. 14, Dandar testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/4/02, pp. 291-292.) 20 Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/9/02, Appendix 6, 566:3-567:5.Prince testimony in the Schaeffer hearings that Minton did not attend any meetings relating to adding David Miscavige as a party. o Hearsay.Completeness Designation:Prince slipped and said Minton was there. (Ex. 15, Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/9/02, pp. 575-576) Prince is also being paid by Dandar to testify as Dandar has requested. (Ex. 16, Prince testimony before Judge Baird, 8/30/02, pp. 370-373) 21 Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/9/02, Appendix 6, 567:6-25, 568:1-11.Prince testified in the proceeding before Judge Schaeffer that "Scientology" told Minton and Minton told Prince that Scientology wanted Minton to take certain actions to get the case dismissed. o Triple hearsay. o No foundation for impeachment. 21 Prince before Judge Schaeffer, 7/9/02, Appendix 6, 568:12-23.Prince speculated that: Mr. Minton was in "anguish over the -- the prospect of -- of lying on behalf of Scientology" and Ms. Brooks was in a panic and desperate frame of mind to do whatever it took to extricate Mr. Minton from the assault that Scientology was enacting upon Mr. Minton. o Hearsay.o Speculation (as to another frame of mind).o Improper lay opinion. 21-23 Haney, 6/19/02 before Judge Schaeffer, Appendix 7, 83:2-9, 83:17-84:25, 94:1-9, 95:12-96:5, 96:13-16.Mr. Haney testified that he did not observe that Mr. Minton had any control over the wrongful death case.Mr. Haney testified that he attended meetings to talk about adding on parties to the wrongful death case and Minton did not attend those particular meetings. o Hearsay.o No personal knowledge.o Immaterial.Completeness Designation:Haney testified he hadn't spoken to Minton since January-May 2000, that he disassociated himself from the LMT (whose activities Minton directed), and that he was hardly ever in Clearwater. Haney stated in his testimony that Robert Minton did attend such a meeting. (Ex. 17, Haney testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/19/02, 78, 140, 146-147, 186-187; id., 95-96.) 25 Peter Alexander testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/7/02, Appendix 8, 137:14-138:11.Peter Alexander testified in the Schaeffer hearings that he overheard a conversation between Robert Minton and Patricia Greenway in which Minton allegedly acknowledged he could not control the wrongful death case. o Double hearsay.o No foundation for impeachment. 25-26 Garko testimony before Judge Schaeffer, Appendix 1, 6/11/02, 96:15-25, 97:1-7.Dr. Garko testimony that Minton did not control the case. o Hearsay.Completeness Designation:Garko testified that Minton said many times he wanted Prince and Brooks used more so as to make the wrongful death case more of a Scientology case, and that Minton was "involved" and "concerned" with the case. (Ex. 18, Garko testimony, 8/29/02, pp. 63-65) 26 Oliver testimony before Judge Schaeffer, Appendix 9, 7/15/02, 316:22-317:5.Frank Oliver testimony that he did not know Mr. Minton to direct the wrongful death litigation. o Hearsay.o No personal knowledge.Completeness Designation:Immediately after this testimony, Judge Schaeffer said, "Truth of the matter is, this witness wouldn't know that. I mean, I guess he'd know if he heard something, but he wouldn't know what went on between Mr. Minton and Mr. Dandar." The question was then limited to Oliver's minimal knowledge. (Ex. 19, Tr., 7/15/02 317) 27 John Merrett testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/23/02, Appendix 10, 73:22-74:10.Merrett testified that it was his understanding that the agreement to donate the bulk of the proceeds of the wrongful death case did not exist. o Hearsay.o No personal knowledge.Completeness Designation:Merrett testified that he did not know which was true, Minton's testimony in his May 2000 depo, or what is in his recantation affidavit. (Ex. 20, Merrett testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/23/02, p. 26) He also specifically stated that he did not know whether there was an agreement or not. (Id., p. 248) 27-29 Haney testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/19/02, Appendix 7, 89:6-91:12.Haney testified in the Schaeffer hearing that there was no agreement that Minton would get a bulk of the proceeds for LMT. Haney also "predicted" Minton "would take over a situation and commandeer it". o Hearsay.o Speculation.Completeness Designation:Objection that Haney was "parroting self-serving statements that Mr. Dandar made" on this issue, was sustained. (Ex. 17, Tr., 6/19/02, p. 90)Haney testified that he had spoken to Liebreich and they would give money to groups that would help people who had been victimized by cults. Liebreich also told Minton this. (Ex. 17, Haney testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/19/02, pp. 88-89) 27-29 Haney testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/19/02, Appendix 7, 91:13-92:18.Haney also claims to have talked to Bob Minton about his internet postings; about which Mr. Minton laughed and claimed to have gotten "carried away". o Hearsay.o No foundation for impeachment. 30 Summers testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/10/02, Appendix 11, 99:4-18.Teresa Summers, a former executive of the LMT testified that Minton and Brooks told her there was no agreement. o Double hearsay. o No foundation for impeachment.Completeness Designation:During Summers' subsequent cross examination, it came out that in September 2001, two days before she resigned from the LMT, Summers was deposed and testified several times that she "never had any discussions with any of the people at LMT as to this alleged agreement." Summers also said of Minton, "No, I don't believe I ever asked him" about it. (Ex. 21, Summers testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/10/02, 124-129) 30 Garko testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/11/02, Appendix 1, 100:2-8.Dr. Garko testified in the Schaeffer hearings that he was not aware of an agreement regarding the bulk of the proceeds. o Hearsay.Completeness Designation:Garko testified he was aware the family testified in their depositions that the monies would be used to fight against Scientology. (Ex. 18, Garko testimony before Judge Baird, 8/29/02, pp. 71-72) 32-36 Merrett testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/23/02, Appendix 10, 35:10-19, 36:6-37:6, 38:3-39:19, 40:16-43:1.Merrett testified that he and not Mr. Dandar prepared an affidavit for Grady Ward, one for Robert Minton, and one for Stacy Brooks. o Hearsay. 36 Minton Deposition, Liebreich v. FSO, 1/13/98, Appendix 4, 65:14-66:1.A Well, he says, I've already had that idea but I haven't discussed it with Dell Liebreich yet.Q Has he since told you that he discussed it with Ms. Liebreich?A Yes.Q What did he say?A He said she agreed to do just that.Q What cult awareness group was agreed on?A No specific groups were discussed. The only one that ... I was discussed was one that Mr. Lottick is involved in... o Hearsay.o Immaterial.Completeness Designation:The testimony Dandar cites does not state there was no agreement. There is additional testimony before what Dandar cited which further confirms there was an agreement. (Ex. 22, Minton Deposition, 1/13/98, pp. 64-65) 36-37 Minton Deposition, Liebriech v. FSO, 5/24/00, Appendix 4, 239:13-18.Q Do you have any agreement of any kind with the Estate of Lisa McPherson?A NoQ Does the Lisa McPherson Trust have any agreement with the Estate of Lisa McPherson?A No o The transcript is hearsay.Completeness Designation:Minton does state in this deposition that there is an agreement, and also authenticates public statements he had made on this subject. (Ex. 23, Minton Deposition, 5/24/00, pp. 391-394) 37 Minton Deposition, Liebreich v. FSO, 9/18/01, Appendix 4, 158:18-25.Minton testified he does not know of anyone investing in the case. o Hearsay.o No foundation for impeachment. 38-44 Minton Deposition, Liebreich v. FSO, et al., 1/13/98, Appendix 4, 219:2-19, 223:1-17, 239:10-18, 391:18-398:10.Minton testified in a deposition taken in the wrongful death case that his conversations regarding the agreement were with Dandar, not directly with the family. o Hearsay.o No foundation for impeachment. 45 Merrett testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/23/02, Appendix 10, 13:5-17.Merrett testified in the proceedings before Judge Schaeffer that he is not aware of Dandar preparing Minton for his May 24, 2000 deposition. It was his understanding that the reason that Minton came to Merrett was because there wasn't anybody involved in the case who could do that without creating a conflict of interest. o Hearsay.o Merrett's unawareness is irrelevant.o Goes to a collateral issue. 47 Brooks testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/6/02, Appendix 13, 308:14-22.LMT got $500,000 from Minton. o Hearsay.o No foundation for impeachment.o Goes to a collateral issue. 49-51 Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/8/02, Appendix 6, 367:2-17, 368:2-6, 446:5-447:23.Prince testified in the hearing before Judge Schaeffer that Minton told him that the check to Dandar was from friends in Europe. o Hearsay.o No foundation for impeachment.Completeness Designation:Prince's first testimony on this was his affidavit, where he said the conversation was in August 2001. That affidavit also says nothing about friends in Europe, but only says Dandar getting the money was a big secret. (Def. Hrg. Ex. 7, April 2002 Affidavit of Jesse Prince, p. 11:2-8)Prince was cross-examined on this point, demonstrating a lack of credibility. (Ex. 24, Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/10/02, pp. 982-985; Ex. 16, Prince testimony before Judge Baird, 8/30/02, pp. 430-439.) 53 Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/8/02, Appendix 6, pp. 386-387."Even though Minton had no account at the UBS Bank, Scientology amazingly was able to obtain a copy of this UBS check before Minton could get a copy!" o Hearsay.o No personal knowledge. 54 Garko testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/11/02, Appendix 1, pp. 35:22-36:13.Dr. Garko testified that in New Hampshire Minton said "generally perhaps people from Europe might be able to fund the case - " o Hearsay.o No foundation for impeachment.o Irrelevant.Completeness Designation:The testimony Dandar quotes is from the wrongful death case hearing. In the hearing in this case, Church counsel objected and Dandar admitted it was irrelevant and not an issue. (Ex. 18, Garko testimony, 8/29/02, pp. 80-83)Immediately after the testimony Dandar did cite, Garko testified that he recalled the name "Fred" being discussed as a person who might be able to fund the case (Ex. 25, Garko testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/11/02, p. 36), which corroborates Minton's testimony on the discussions of money in New Hampshire. 54 Minton testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/21/02, pp. 443-446 [not in Appendix]During the hearing before Judge Schaeffer, Minton admitted that the $300,000 Clambake transfer to the LMT and the anonymous $500,000 transfer to the LMT from Europe were really from Minton. Dandar states Minton lied about this in his deposition in this case on 4/8/02. o Hearsay.o Goes to a collateral issue.Completeness Designation:At the end of the 4/8/02 deposition a break was taken. After the break, it was put on the record that there would be some things that would need to be corrected, which Minton would correct when the deposition resumed. (Ex. 26, Minton deposition testimony, 4/8/02, pp. 119-120) Minton then corrected his testimony (Ex. 27, Minton testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/21/02, 444-446; Ex. 28, Additional Affidavit of Robert Minton Recanting Testimony, 6/3/02, 6-7.) 56-57 Minton testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/23/02, Appendix 4, 926:6-928:17.Dandar quotes for almost two pages a discussion between Judge Schaeffer and Mr. Howie, counsel for Robert Minton. o The comments of the court and counsel are not evidence.o Irrelevant.o Hearsay.o The testimony is not relevant to any material issue in this action. 57-58 Minton testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/28/02, Appendix 4, 1251:7-22.Minton caused a check to be issued to Gerry Armstrong. Dandar alleges Minton did this to evade taxes. o Hearsay.o No foundation for impeachment.o Irrelevant and immaterial.Completeness Designation:Just before the testimony Dandar cited, he asked Minton if he had done this to evade taxes and Minton denied it. (Ex. 5, Minton testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/28/02, pp. 1250-1251) 58-59 Minton testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/28/02, Appendix 4, 1252:23-1255:3.Minton testified that he does not recall if he paid taxes on the repayment of the $100,000 loan from Gerry Armstrong. Dandar stated this was an attempt to conceal tax evasion. o Hearsay.o Irrelevant and immaterial.Completeness Designation:Minton testified several times before Judge Schaeffer that he was not concerned about allegations of tax evasion. (Minton testimony before Judge Schaeffer: Ex. 29, 5/24/02, pp. 1085-1086, 1132-1133; Ex. 5, 5/28/02, pp. 1250-1251; Ex. 30, 5/29/02, p. 1772.) 60 Order in RTC v. Estate of Lisa McPherson, Appendix 14. o Irrelevant and immaterial. 66-67 Merrett testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/23/02, Appendix 10, 48:21-49:8, 49:15-16, 49:21-22, 51:8-23, 54:8-13, 55:7-21.Merrett arranged a donation from Operation Clambake to LMT. Merrett claims he did not know the money was from Minton. o Hearsay.o Goes to a collateral issue. 69-70 Dandar testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/4/02, Appendix 5, 345:14-346:14.Judge Schaeffer refused to allow counsel to ask if the "personal loans" were deposited in Dandar's personal accounts. o Comments of the court are not evidence.o Irrelevant and immaterial. 75 Minton Deposition, Liebreich v. FSO, et al., 1/13/98, Appendix 4, 46:20-24, 47:1-9. Q My question is: Was this $100,000 a loan to Mr. Dandar?A. It was Q Or a gift to Mr. Dandar?A It requires a little bit of thought because it could be ... either depending on what happens in the case.Q Can you explain that?A What I have said and what he has said is that if they - "they" being the estate of Lisa McPherson - are successful in getting money back over and above their legal expenses in this case and they had $100,000 left to pay me, I would get paid back my $100,000. If they do not succeed in this case, they're under no obligation to pay me back. o The testimony has not been provided in the Appendix.o Hearsay. Completeness Designation:In that deposition, Minton additionally testified that the money was to be used for the McPherson case, not for Dandar's personal use. (Ex. 22, Minton Deposition, 1/13/98, pp. 43, 44, 158) 75 Minton Deposition, Liebreich v. FSO, et al., 5/24/00, Appendix 4, 217:11-218:1. Q What is the agreement with Mr. Dandar with respect to the over one million dollars that you've given him?A The agreement is basically that if and when the Estate of Lisa McPherson prevails against the Church of Scientology and collects money, that the estate will pay back out of the proceeds of that, if the proceeds are sufficient to cover all the expenses, the principal amount that I have advanced to the estate of Mr. Dandar. That's it.Q Advanced to the estate for Mr. Dandar?A No, to Mr. Dandar for - to prosecute the case of the estate. o Hearsay. 78 Minton testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/29/02, Appendix 4, 1525:20-1526:2, 1528:16-18.Minton testified in the hearings before Judge Schaeffer that Mike Rinder implied during meetings that Dandar had used Minton's money to buy properties. o Hearsay. 79 Minton testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/7/02, Appendix 4, 920:16-921:2.Minton testified that Dandar told him he took some of the money Minton had been giving him for his personal use. Minton said "okay". o The testimony has not been provided in the Appendix.o Hearsay. 80-82 Dandar testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/16/02, Appendix 5, 35:2-38:11.Dandar testified that the conditions of the loan were originally vague and at the end of '99 or beginning of 2000 Dandar went to Minton and Minton said Dandar could use the money any way he wanted. o The testimony is not included in the Appendix.o Hearsay. 85 Pltf's Ex. 15 before Judge Schaeffer, Dandar letter to Liebreich of 2/10/97, Appendix 15. o Letter was not introduced.o Not authenticated.o Irrelevant and immaterial. 85-86 Monique Yingling notes of meetings, Appendix 16. o Hearsay.o Not authenticated. o Not introduced. 88 Yingling testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/12/02, Appendix 19, 61-62.Ms. Yingling testified that the list of church litigation costs, about 35 million dollars, was the magnitude of the damages which Minton's lawyer, Jonas, said would be for the planned RICO case. o Hearsay. 89, 121-122 Leipold testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/3/02, Appendix 20, 27:14-24.Leipold testified that originally he received a telephone call from Brooks in which she said that she and Robert Minton were attempting to settle with the Church and she wished him to withdraw her declaration from the court. Later that day, Bob Minton asked Leipold to dismiss the action on behalf of his client. o Hearsay.o Double hearsay. 92-93 Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/8/02, Appendix 6, 200:25-202:5.Jesse Prince testifies regarding "noisy investigations." o Hearsay.o Not authenticated.o Not introduced.o Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr. at 221-223).o Irrelevant and immaterial.o Witness lacks personal knowledge.o Witness not qualified to offer interpretation. 93 Pltf's Ex. 157 before Judge Schaeffer, "HCO Policy Letter of 16 February 1969, Battle Tactics." o Not authenticated.o Not introduced.o Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr. at 221-223).o Irrelevant and immaterial.o Hearsay. 94 Pltf's Ex. 109-C before Judge Schaeffer, "HCO Policy Letter of 15 August 1960, Dept. of Govt Affairs." o Not authenticated.o Not introduced.o Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr. at 221-223).o Irrelevant and immaterial.o Hearsay. 94 Pltf's Ex. 169 before Judge Schaeffer, Ability, "The Scientologist." o Not authenticated.o Not introduced.o Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr. at 221-223).o Irrelevant and immaterial.o Hearsay. 95 Pltf's Ex. 109J before Judge Schaeffer, "HCO Executive Letter of 5 September 1960." o Not authenticated.o Not introduced.o Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr. at 221-223).o Irrelevant and immaterial.o Hearsay. 95-96 Pltf's Ex. 122 before Judge Schaeffer, "Manuel [sic] of Justice." o Not authenticated.o Not introduced.o Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr. at 221-223).o Irrelevant and immaterial.o Hearsay. 97, 127 Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/18/02, Appendix 6, 151:17-152:16.Prince reading from and interpreting portions of a policy letter for the Department of Government Affairs. o Not authenticated.o Not introduced.o Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr. at 221-223).o Irrelevant and immaterial.o Hearsay. 98-103 Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/8/02, Appendix 6, 205:13-208:16, 211:11-212:7, 219:2-20, 220:10-221:5, 222:3-24, 223:4-9, 230:9-21, 237:16-238:2, 243:18-244:8.Prince acknowledged very little "experience" but nevertheless testified regarding specific events he was told about in 1985 regarding alleged investigations of specific persons. o Double hearsay.o Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr. at 221-223).o No personal knowledge.o Probative value substantially outweighed by prejudice.o "Other crimes, wrongs or acts" do not pertain to plaintiff.o Refers to documents not introduced, not admitted, not offered.o Irrelevant and immaterial. 103 Oliver testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/15/02, Appendix 9, "beginning at [p.] 290".Frank Oliver, a former Scientologist, testified regarding an alleged policy of finding or manufacturing evidence to make "the enemy" sue for peace. o Double hearsay.o Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr. at 221-223).o No personal knowledge.o Probative value substantially outweighed by prejudice.o "Other crimes, wrongs or acts" do not pertain to plaintiff.o Refers to documents not introduced, not admitted, not offered.o Irrelevant and immaterial. 105 Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/8/02, Appendix 6, 194:18-195:11.Prince testifies identifying policies of Scientology and giving his interpretation of them. o Not offered.o Not authenticated.o Not admitted.o Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr. at 221-223).o Irrelevant and immaterial.o Hearsay.o Witness not qualified to interpret. 105-106 Nancy Many testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/12/02, Appendix 22, 156:18-157:6.Ms. Many testified that Minton said that the Church said they could settle but no more money to Dandar. o Triple hearsay. 106-108 Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/8/02, Appendix 6, 384:17-385:10, 385:16-387:5, 388:13-389:6, 389:17-390:2, 391:1-9.Prince testified that Minton called him and said he was "going to jail" although he wouldn't say why. Prince testified that Minton told him Mike Rinder had somehow gotten a copy of the $500,000 check, and told him that he knew that Bob Minton lied in deposition about this $500,000 check and they were going to prosecute him for it. o Double hearsay. o No foundation for impeachment. 109-112 Letter from Dandar to Minton, 3/30/02. o Not authenticated.o Not offered.o Not admitted.o Hearsay.o Inadmissible prior consistent statement not made before the event giving rise to the motive that affects the testimony of the witness.o Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr. at 221-223). 112 E-mail [sic - letter] from Jonas to Dandar, 4/12/02, Appendix 18. o Hearsay.o Not authenticated.o Not introduced. 114-115 Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/8/02, Appendix 6, 432:23-434:2.Prince testified that he went to see a criminal attorney and reported what was going to be "created and done" against Dandar. o Hearsay.o Improper and inadmissible prior consistent statement not made before the event giving rise to the motive that affects the testimony of the witness. 115 "Court order" for deposition of Therese Minton in Liebreich v. FSO, et al., Appendix 23. o The Church's proposed order (represented by Dandar to be "a court order") in another proceeding is unauthenticated, was not offered or admitted in this proceeding and is hearsay and irrelevant. 116 Dandar testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/4/02, Appendix 5, 313:15-314:17.Dandar testified that Minton was extremely concerned that Dandar hurry up and deposit the May 2000 check "Because something is happening in the Swiss banks. And there is a new prosecutor in Switzerland, there is a new judge. They had a hearing about me." o Hearsay.o Dandar's testimony regarding what he "took" Minton's comments to mean is speculation. 117 Pltf's Ex. 4 before Judge Schaeffer, Minton's Harassment Time Line, Appendix 24. o Not introduced.o Not authenticated.o Not admitted.o Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr. at 221-223).o Irrelevant and immaterial.o Hearsay. 117-118 Brooks testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/16/02, 1398:25-1399:21, Appendix 13.Minton told Brooks if the case was not dismissed immediately the "blood" of his daughters, his wife, and himself would be on Dandar's hands. o Hearsay. 119 Yingling testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/12/02, 217:22-218:14, Appendix 19.Ms. Yingling testified regarding statements made about RICO. o Double hearsay.Completeness Designation:Ms. Yingling denied that the purpose of detailing the litigation costs was to show the magnitude of the Church's RICO case against Minton. Jonas said that, not Rosen. (Ex. 8, Yingling testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/12/02, p. 186) 120 Brooks testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/7/02, 563:2-22, Appendix 13.Brooks testified that she did not recall a RICO suit being shown at the meeting, then said Mr. Rosen may have held something up and said this was a draft. That "may have happened. I'm not sure." o Hearsay. 122-123 Alexander testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/7/02, 189:13-190:9, Appendix 8.Alexander testified that Minton said the Scientologists were driving him crazy and he broke down into tears, said he had tax problems with respect to the Nigerian money and that was worrying him. o Double hearsay.o No foundation for impeachment. 123 Summers testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/10/02, 75:9-16, Appendix 11.Q Well, so why was it coming from Operation Clambake?A Mmm, see, that was the tax evasion part. It was as a donation. Right? And I guess if it comes in as a donation to a company, then rather than Bob bringing his own money in -- you know, I don't know all of the details of this, but this was my understanding -- that then he didn't have to pay taxes because it was a donation to a company. o Double hearsay. o No personal knowledge.o No foundation for impeachment.o Goes to a collateral issue.Completeness Designation:Summers admitted she didn't know any of the details about this and her testimony is just hearsay of what Patrick Jost allegedly told her. Minton never told Summers he was concerned about taxes. (Ex. 21, Summers testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/10/02, pp. 75-76) 124fn 12 Patrick Jost Deposition, Liebreich v. FSO, et al., 10/30/01, Appendix 25, pp. 62-63.Jost testified that he has assisted Minton concerning tax implications of transfers of funds from Europe to the United States. o Hearsay. 124-125 Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/18/02, Appendix 6, 119:6-22, 120:7-24.Prince testified that he observed the "noisy investigation" of Bob Minton specifically as it related to his business partner, Jeff Schmidt. o Hearsay. 125 Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/18/02, 124:13-20, Appendix 6.Q Are you aware of any kind of trouble that was started with Nigeria in reference to the Swiss government?A I know that certain allegations were brought in Nigeria. And the private investigator working on Scientology's behalf did go to Switzerland, talked to prosecutors, talked to law enforcement, and to use whatever sway or ability that they had to try to get charges brought against Bob in - o Double hearsay.o No personal knowledge. 126-127 Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/18/02, 127:12-22, 132:10-20, 133:7-10, 137:24-138:2, 139:3-7, 140:8-16, Appendix 6.Prince testimony regarding the alleged harassment of Minton. o Hearsay. 131-136 Hearing Tr., 6/7/02, 63:12-65:24; 6/10/02, 4:23-8:8; 6/11/02, 47-48, Appendix 26.Colloquy of counsel and Judge Schaeffer regarding turning over Mr. Jonas' notes. o Colloquy is not evidence.o Colloquy is not relevant. 137, fn16 Pltf's Ex. 5 before Judge Schaeffer, Declaration of Stacy Young, 12/14/94. o Hearsay.o Irrelevant and immaterial. 137, fn16 Brooks testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/6/02, Appendix 13, "questioning beginning at 411" o Double hearsay.o Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr. at 221-223).o Irrelevant and immaterial.o "Other crimes, wrongs or acts" do not relate to plaintiff. 138, fn 18;151-152 In Michael Hurtado v. Graham E. Berry, in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, Case # BC 208 227, Robert J. Cipriano was deposed in the case on 8/7/00 and made numerous unsupportable personal attacks on counsel. o Hearsay.o Hearsay within hearsay.o Not offered.o Not authenticated.o Not admitted.o Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr. at 221-223).o Irrelevant and immaterial.o "Other crimes, wrongs, or acts" do not relate to plaintiff.o Goes to collateral matter.o Statement quoted not submitted. 138,fn 20 Transcript in Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology of California, Los Angeles County Superior Court, Appendix 27.This transcript is presented to show that Mr. Rosen allegedly used the Brooks recantation affidavit filed in this case as the basis to attack Mr. Leipold. Rosen testimony, 8/30, 152:8-14, Appendix 17.Rosen denied doing this. o Hearsay.o Irrelevant and immaterial. 139fn 24, 149-150 "The Two Faces of Scientology," American Lawyer, July 1992, Appendix 28."Boston personal injury lawyer Michael Flynn, for example, who at one time represented more than two dozen plaintiffs against the church, was sued by the church more than a dozen times in four jurisdictions for everything from contempt of court to defamation. All the suits were eventually dropped or dismissed. (Flynn declined comment pursuant to the terms of a settlement he received from the church in 1986.)" o Hearsay and contains hearsay.o The article included in Dandar's appendix is not the referenced article. 142 Pltf's Ex. 165 before Judge Schaeffer, HCO Policy Letter of 18 October 1967, Penalties for Lower Conditions.ENEMY - SP Oder [sic]. Fair game. May be deprived of property or injured by any means by any Scientologist without any discipline of the Scientologist. May be tricked, sued or lied to or destroyed. o Hearsay.o Hearsay within hearsay.o Irrelevant and immaterial.o Not offered.o Not authenticated.o Not admitted.o Excluded (8/29 Tr., at p. 255).Completeness Designation:This policy was cancelled in 1970 by HCO Policy Letter of 6 October 1970, Issue III (Ex. 31 hereto). 142-147 Oliver testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/15/02, 272:2-3, 12-19, 280:11-281:10, 283:4-23, 286:10-288:10, 288:22-289:16, Appendix 9.Oliver testified in the hearing before Judge Schaeffer regarding alleged policies and practices of the Church with regard to litigation, information gathering, intelligence and fair game. o Hearsay.o Not offered.o Not authenticated.o Not admitted.o Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr. at 221-223).o Irrelevant and immaterial.o Goes to collateral issue.o No personal knowledge.o Not qualified to interpret.Completeness Designation:Oliver read into the record or acknowledged excerpts from several church policies on these areas, demonstrating that whatever action is taken is legal and truthful. (Ex. 19, Oliver testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/15/02, pp. 472-486) 153 Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/10/02, 988:2-5 [not in the Appendices].Prince testified sarcastically that they "talked about committing perjury on behalf of Scientology." o Hearsay. CONCLUSION For all the foregoing reasons, this Objection to all of Dandar's "evidence" submitted for the first time after the conclusion of the hearing, should be sustained, and all such proffered evidence should be stricken and excluded. I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy hereof has been furnished by HAND DELIVERY to Thomas John Dandar, Esq. and Kennan G. Dandar, Esq., Dandar & Dandar, P.A., P.O. Box 24597, Tampa, FL 33623-4597; and by REGULAR U.S. MAIL to Anthony P. Battaglia, Battaglia, Ross, Dicus & Wein, P.A., First Union Building, 980 Tyrone Boulevard, P.O. Box 41100, St. Petersburg, FL 33743-1100; Thomas H. McGowan, P.A., 150 Second Avenue North, Suite 1500, St. Petersburg, FL 33701; and Luke Lirot, Esq., 112 East Street, Suite B, Tampa, FL 3360, this 13th day of September, 2002. JOHNSON, BLAKELY, POPE, BOKOR, RUPPEL & BURNS, P.A. By: _______________________________________ F. Wallace Pope, Jr. Post Office Box 1368 Clearwater, Florida 33757 Tel: (727) 461-1818 Fax: (727) 441-8617 SPN #00002797 Samuel D. Rosen 75 East 55th Street, Room 503 New York, New York 10022 Telephone: (212) 318-6000 Telecopier: (212) 319-4090 Attorneys for Plaintiff Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization, Inc.
To Life and Death of Lisa McPherson