------------------------------------------------------------------- F.A.C.T.Net, Inc. (Fight Against Coercive Tactics Network, Incorporated) a non-profit computer bulletin board and electronic library 601 16th St. #C-217 Golden, Colorado 80401 USA BBS 303 530-1942 FAX 303 530-2950 Office 303 473-0111 This document is part of an electronic lending library and preservational electronic archive. F.A.C.T.Net does not sell documents, it only lends them according to the terms of your library cardholder agreement with F.A.C.T.Net, Inc. ------------------------------------------------------------------- \Hendricks paper\Page.00001 NEW RELIGIONS & THE LAW: THE IMPACT OF MOLKO ON ORGANIZATIONAL CONDUCT Evan D. Hendricks Editor/Publisher Privacy Times Washington, D.C. \Hendricks paper\Page.00002 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author wishes to thank Ford Greene for his invaluable insights and contributions to this paper. Thanks also go to Priscilla Coates, Jon Atack and Larry Hansen for their editorial suggestions and assistance. \Hendricks paper\Page.00003 In recent years, there have been several significant cases of civil litigation involving organizations that are described as "new religions," "minority religions," "religious sects" or "cults."' They have involved serious allegations of tortious conduct, such as fraud, undue influence, intentional infliction of emotional distress and false imprisonment. These cases also have involved millions of dollars in actual and punitive damages, bringing them into the "Big Leagues" of U.S. litigation. There is little doubt that some of the prominent cases have formed a cutting edge of a growing area of legal action. Due to the allegations and finding of serious misconduct, on one hand, and the assertion by some defendants that the conduct is protected by the First Amendment, it is only logical that new religions would produce a new area of legal activity. Dick Anthony and Thomas Robbins assert in a recent essay that litigation in the "cult wars" have shifted from "deprogramming" cases to civil suits by ex-converts based on "brainwashing claims ."2 This statement oversimplifies the situation and gives a misleading impression. First, there are several highly contested "deprogramming" cases pending in courts around the country.' Moreover, in one case a Colorado jury acquitted a deprogrammer who had abducted a member of the Unification Church, due to the "choice of evils" defense.4 Undoubtedly, several civil cases have forced courts to wrestle with the difficult issues of defining when individuals' autonomy are negatively effected by harmful actions, many of which the religion in question considers a "devotional practice" within the protected scope of First Amendment immunity. The term "brainwashing" may not be the most descriptive or productive for analyzing significant civil cases. The term For stylistic purposes. the author will use these terms interchangeably. Clearly, different individuals have preferences among these, depending on their point of view. However, the author finds nothing pejorative in any of them. Webster's New Colleaiate Dictionarv defines "cult" as a "formal religious veneration." It defines "sect" as "a dissenting religious body." 2 Anthony & Robbins, Law, Social Science and The "Brainwashing" Exception To the First Amendment, Behavioral Sciences and the Law, Vol. 10, 5-29 (1992) 3 Galen G. Kelly, a veteran deprogrammer, in October 1992 was charged with conspiring to kidnap an heir to the Du Pont chemical fortune, and is likely to stand trial. Four other deprogrammers are awaiting trial in Idaho in a case involving a member of Church Universal and Triumphant. Peoole v. Whelan and Brandvberrv, 87 CR 2056, jury verdict returned Nov. 3, 1988. (Verdict later overturned on appeal.) \Hendricks paper\Page.00004 conjures up visions of North Korean prison camps where physical coercion was always present. In fact, the term was used in China to describe the indoctrination of students in "revolutionary colleges," where there was no physical coercion, at least not in the same sense as a North Korean prison camp. Literallv translated from Chinese, the term means "ideological remolding."~ A more meaningful and applicable term under traditional tort law is "undue influence because it describes the imposition of psychological force upon the inductee."6 Another important term is "informed consent" and the individual's "capacity" to give consent. Many of the leading cases involve a chain of alleged torts with varying sequential orders and combinations: fraud, undue influence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment, to name a few. A key point of debate has been -- and will continue to be -- the level of physical coercion, if any, that there must be before an 5 The Chinese term for thought reform, ssu-hsiang kai-tsao, literally means the remaking or the reconstructing of thought. As "thought" in the Communist vocabulary is practically synonymous with ideology, "thought reform" and "ideological remolding" are almost synonymous. Chen, Thouaht Reform of the Chinese Intellectuals (1960), Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, at 72. Lifton, Chinese Communist "Thouaht Reform": Confession And Re-Education Of Western Civilians (1957) 33 New York Academy of Medicine 626 ("The Chinese Communists have developed a peculiar brand of soul surgery which they practice with impressive skill - the process of "thought reform.") The term "brainwashing" was first introduced into Western parlance by the reporter, Edward Hunter. Hunter, Brainwashino In Red China (1953) New Vork: Vanguard Press. One of Hunter's Chinese informants had told him of "hsi nao" which translated into "brain cleansing." "Undue influence ... is a shorthand legal phrase used to describe persuasion which tends to be coercive in nature, persuasion which overcomes the will without convincing the judgement. [citation.] The hallmark of such persuasion is a high pressure, a pressure which works on the mental, moral or emotional weakness to such an extent that it approaches the boundaries of coercion. In this sense undue influence has been called overpersuasion. Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School District (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 123, 130-132. "Whether from weakness on one side, or strength on the other, or a combination of the two, undue influence occurs whenever there results 'that kind of influence or supremacy of one mind over another by which that other is prevented from acting according to his own wish or judgement, and whereby the will of the person is overborne and he is induced to do or forebear to do an act which he would not do, or would do, if left to act freely. (Webb v. Saunders, 79 Cal.App.2d 863, 871.)" 2 \Hendricks paper\Page.00005 individual can sue a religious sect for "undue influence" and any harms flowing from it. In some cases, courts have found the level of coercion to be pronounced, and have refrained from looking more closely at a group's techniques for "processing" new recruits, members and staffers. In a few cases, however, there is very little physical coercion in evidence, but fraud or other tortious conduct has led courts and juries to find "undue influence" or a harmful form of persuasion in the actions of new religions. The leading case addressing the issues is Molko v Holy Sl3irit Association7, in which the California Supreme Court for the first time ruled that the Unification Church's deceptive recruitment practices resulted in the tortious coercive persuasion of plaintiff David Molko. The Supreme Court's 6-1 ruling affirmed the theory espoused fifteen years ago by Richard Delgado that the Church engaged in a manipulation of knowledge and capacity which robbed Molko of his capacity to give informed consent.8 A central purpose of this paper is to explore the "Molko Model" and its application to three other leading cases involving religious cults. In addition to ongoing and vigorous debate over whether thought reform can only occur at the point of the gun, or can take place without the use of physical force, there are important lessons to learn from recent litigation involving new religions. Some of the more notable cases have begun to define what constitutes protected First Amendment activity and what violates the constraints imposed by valid exercise of the police power of the state. In a sense, these cases represent a continuation of a 100-year-old tradition of court oversight of conduct that takes place in the name of religion. They have extended and applied traditional concepts of tort law to the most controversial actions carried out by such groups as the Church of Scientology, the Unification Church, Hare Krishnas and the Church Universal and Triumphant. One obvious lesson is that new religions, like old ones, are subject to many of the same rules as are nonreligious organizations when it comes to actions which violate the rights of others. It is important to note that most cases have not legally challenged the religious status of cults, and instead have concentrated on the conduct and activities which gave rise to harms. As we will see, that may change in the very near future. · Molko v Holv Soirit Association, 46 Cal. 3d 1092, (1988) · Delgado. Richard, "Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion Under the First Amendment," Southern California Law Review, 51 (1977); and "Cults and Conversion: The Case For Informed Consent, Georgia Law Review, 553, (1982) 3 \Hendricks paper\Page.00006 Backoround: Reliqious Riqhts And The First Amendment In Wollersheim v. Church of Scientolosv v. California9, the California Court of Appeal (Second Division) effectively summarized the judiciary's authority over matters involving religions, religious beliefs and religious conduct. Religious freedom is guaranteed American citizens by the First Amendment, which states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . n (U.S. Const. Amend I) While the First Amendment previously only governed the Federal Government, the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment extended its strictures to the States as well. The First Amendment creates two very different protections. The "Establishment Clause" guarantees that government will not use its resources to impose religion on anyone. The "Free Exercise Clause," on the other hand, guarantees that government will not prevent its citizens from pursuing any religion they choose. (Wollersheim) The establishment clause comes into play when a government policy has the effect of promoting religion -- as by financing religious schools or requiring religious prayers in public schools. Such policies violate the Establishment Clause unless they survive a three-part test: 1) They must have a secular purpose 2) Their primary effects must be ones which neither advance nor inhibit religion. 3) They must avoid any excessive entanglement with religion. The Free Exercise Clause, as interpreted by courts, provides absolute protection for a person's religious beliefs as well as any other kind of belief, no matter how disagreeable some might find them. However, courts have restricted "expression" of religious beliefs, particularly those expressions based upon action. Put simply, "Freedom of Belief is absolutely protected. Freedom of action is not." The effect of court interpretations is that courts, in an exercise the police powers to protect the health and safety of citizens, may interfere with the expression of a constitutionally protected belief, if they satisfy a four-part test: 1) The Government must be seeking to further an overriding state interest. Wollersheim v. Church of Scientolonv, 58 Cal.App. 3d 872 (1989) 4 \Hendricks paper\Page.00007 2) The burden on expression must be essential to further this particular state interest.iO 3) The type and level of burden imposed must be the minimum required to achieve the state interest. 4) The measure imposing the burden must apply to everyone, not merely those who have a religious belief. Consequently, it theoretically may not discriminate against any religion. It is perhaps fitting that the seminal case on the Free Exercise clause involved a relatively new religion, the Mormon Church. In O 1878, in Revnolds v. United States", the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a Utah resident's attempt to overturn his conviction for bigamy under territorial law because polygamy was a central tenet of his Mormon faith. The Court held that polygamy could be outlawed because it "has always been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe . . . and from the earliest history of England has been treated as an offense against society." In 1904, the Supreme court ruled that adults and children can be compelled to be vaccinated for communicable diseases though their religious beliefs oppose vaccination."12 In the 1940s, two important cases were decided by the Supreme Court. In 1940, in Cantwell v. Connecticut13 the Supreme Court drew the ma j or distinction under the First Amendment between "beliefs" and "actions." Drawing upon the lessons of Revnolds 70 years earlier, the Court said: [T~he [First] Amendment embraces two concepts, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.' In 1944, in United States v. BallardiSthe Court ruled that the judiciary could not inquire into the truth or validity of sincerely held religious beliefs. " see U.S. v. Lee. 455 U.S. 252. 1981 " Revnold v. U.S. 98 U.S. 145, 1878 12 Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 1904 11 Cantwell v. Connecticut 310 U.S. 296, 1940 Ibid Is U~S~ V. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 5 \Hendricks paper\Page.00008 In 1943, the Supreme Court ruled that the state, under public health laws, could prohibit parents from allowing their children to distribute religious literature even though it was motivated by a religious duty to avoid everlasting destruction at Armageddon. "The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death," the Court ruled.16 More recently, in 1986, the Supreme Court upheld the Pentagon's ban against a Jewish officer's insistence on wearing a Yarmulke, finding that the military's need for uniformity outweighed the officer's marginal interest in wearing the headpiece.17 In 1990, the Supreme Court upheld a decision to disqualify two claimants for unemployment because they had been fired for using peyote, which the claimants argued was a protected religious practice. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that a state was not required to accommodate a religious group by carving an exception to a law of general applicability (as opposed to one directed at regulating a specific religious practice).18 Prior to the 1980s, one of the most significant cases involving cults and issues of undue influence/coercive persuasion was Katz v. Suoerior court19. Several parents of adult children who had become members of the Unification Church applied under a California conservatorship law to have the children declared mentally incompetent due to thought-control techniques. The parents sought to remove their children from the church's control. But the California Appeals Court ruled that the conservatorship law was unconstitutionally vague and that using it to acquire control over a person mentally disabled by thought reform would deprive the conservatee's right to freedom of religion and association, in violation of the U.S. Supreme court's ruling in Ballard. The decision had the effect of rejecting on First Amendment grounds any linkage between devotional practices and thought reform techniques. This reasoning represented prevailing law when the California Supreme Court considered the Molko case. 16 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 1943 17 Goldman v. Weinberser, 475 U.S. 513, 1986 18 Emoloyment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. , 1990 19 Katz v. Su~erior Court, 73 Cal App. 3d 952, 1977 6 \Hendricks paper\Page.00009 The Molko Case The case of Molko v. Holy Soirit Association20 continues to stand as the most significant in context of cults/new religions and their indoctrination techniques, as it was the first case to set clearer standards of unprotected conduct. A graduate of law school, Molko was recruited into the Unification Church in multi-step process in which recruiters initially denied that they were affiliated with a religious group in general or the Unification Church in particular. Sitting at a bus stop in San Francisco, Molko was approached by two Church members, Bush and Patton, who informed him that they did work on "social" and "environmental" issues. They invited Molko to attend a dinner that night of colleagues who shared their interests. Molko asked if they had a religious affiliation. "Nothing like that," they responded. In fact, they were church officials and were working to get Molko to join. Molko accepted the dinner invitation. At the dinner, Molko witnessed a slide show of a farm called "Booneville," described as a rural getaway north of San Francisco where people went for relaxation and pleasure. Molko was urged by the two men who had invited him to dinner to accept the invitation. All of his needs would be taken care of there, but the van was leaving in a few minutes. Molko boarded the bus. After driving for several hours, Molko arrived at the farm late at night, where he was put into a shelter. Upon waking the next morning, he discovered 75 others were sleeping there. The schedule was tightly planned and left him no time to himself: Days were filled with calisthenics, lectures and low-protein meals. On the second day, he asked the name of the group and was told it was the "Creative Community Project." He asked if the "Project" was associated with any religious organization. "No," was the reply of a Project official. That night he told Bush and Patton he wanted to return to San Francisco. Although they said he was free to leave and that a bus would leave at three o'clock in the morning, they strongly urged him to stay and hear important information that would be discussed in the days to come. Feeling tired and less than enthusiastic about a three a.m. bus trip, he agreed to stay on a little longer. The third day, after a repeat of lectures from the first day, he was informed that the group's teachings derived from many 20 Molko v. Holy Soirit Association, 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 1988 7 \Hendricks paper\Page.00010 philosophical sources, including Aristotle, Jefferson and Reverend Sun Myung Moon. Molko found that he was constantly followed by the same two people in order to keep him apart from and prevent communication with others who also were new to the group situation. The pair also guided David into participation in small group discussions, which were always led by the same person within the same group after each of the indoctrination lectures. During the course of small-group meetings, church members continually urged David to "open up." One night, Molko was told the group was about to leave Booneville for "Camp K" -- another group-owned retreat used on weekends. David said he wanted to return to San Francisco, but again was urged to give the group a few more days. He agreed to see if Camp K would improve his opinion. The routine contirrued there. First exercise, then lectures and then discussion. After transferring to a second farm -- 12 days after he joined the group -- a staff person finally admitted that the farm was run by the Unification Church. Despite his initial anger, she convinced him to stay. When his parents visited him sometime later, he rebuffed their effort to persuade him to leave. Molko graduated from the farm, totally devoted to the Church. He was informed he could do his part by passing the bar exam and becoming a lawyer. The Church paid for him to take the exam. But before that could happen, he was kidnapped by two deprogrammers, who kept him in a motel for three days. By the third day, Molko, believing he had been the victim of brainwashing, decided to leave the church and was reunified with his parents. He later filed suit, seeking a return of the $6,000 he paid to the Church and $100,000 in damages. The suit charged that the Church used fraud to induce him into joining, defrauded him out of the $6,000, brainwashed him and intentionally inflicted emotional distress. But the California trial judge dismissed the suit. A California appeals court affirmed the dismissal finding that, based upon Katz, it lacked jurisdiction to pass judgment on the Church's religious practices. A turning point came when Molko asked Bay Area Attorney Ford Greene to take over their case. Greene, a former Moonie and a former deprogrammer, had several years experience in cult litigation. He had the zeal and legal experience to take the case to the California Supreme Court. i Greene's strategy was to emphasize the deception practiced by the church against Molko, as well as the practical effect of that i deception, to subject him to a process that reduced his ability to reason and exercise informed consent. It also involved a strong emphasis on the difference between the absolute right to 8 \Hendricks paper\Page.00011 freedom of religious belief, and the conditional right to freedom of rel igious ly-mot ivated action. This strategy was designed to make the fraud charge a vital link to the more expansive charges of emotional distress suffered by Molko after being subj ected to Moonie thought reform processes. The California Supreme Court reversed the two lower courts, and ordered that the case proceed to a jury trial in San Francisco. "While religious belief is absolutely protected, religiously ~-1 motivated conduct is not," Justice Mosk. "Such conduct 'remains C/ subject to regulation for the protection of society.' Government action burdening religious conduct is subject to a balancing test, in which the importance of the state's interest is weighed against the severity of the burden imposed on religion. The greater burden imposed on religion, the more compelling must be the government interest at stake." To pass the balancing test for regulating religious conduct, the government or court must meet the further requirement that (1) no action imposing a lesser burden on religion would satisfy the government's interest and (2) the action does not discriminate between religions, or between religion and non religion, Justice Mosk said. The conduct at issue, to which the Unification Church readily admitted, was fraud. The court said the necessary elements of fraud are (1) misrepresentation (false presentation, concealment or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity; (3) intent to defraud; (4) justifiable reliance (when the misrepresentation or nondisclosure was an immediate cause of the plaintiff's conduct or induced him into entering a contract; and (5) resulting damages. If a court determined that the church's practice amounted to fraud, causing the unwitting exposure to coercive persuasion, then the only burden placed on it would be the potential closing of one questionable avenue for bringing new members into the Church, the State Supreme Court said. The California High Court had no problem finding a "compelling state interest" in regulating potentially fraudulent practices that can threaten public safety, peace or order. "For it is one thing when a person knowingly and voluntarily ~s. submits to a process involving coercive influence, as a novice does \W on entering a monastery or a seminary. But it is quite another when a person is subjected to coercive persuasion without his knowledge or consent. "While some individuals who experience coercive persuasion emerge unscathed, many others develop serious and sometimes irreversible physical and psychiatric disorders, up to and including schizophrenia, self-mutilation and suicide. The state clearly has a compelling interest in preventing its citizens 9 \Hendricks paper\Page.00012 from being deceived into submitting unknowingly to such a potentially dangerous process," Justice Mosk said. The Supreme Court also said the lower court dismissed the suit prematurely, as it should have permitted the jury to determine, as a question of fact, whether or not the church's original fraudulent inducement into an atmosphere of coercive persuasion was extreme and outrageous. "The church's continued deceptions might well be seen as conduct breaching plaintiff's trust in the integrity of those who were promising to make their lives more meaningful," Justice Mosk said, ~Jj directing that the case go to trial. If the trial court found fraud, the burden would be minimal, as it "in no way or degree [would~ prevent or inhibit" the church from carrying on most of its practices. "At most, it potentially closes one questionable avenue for" recruitment, Judge Mosk said. "Being subject to liability for fraudulent recruiting does not in any way or degree prevent or inhibit the church from operating O their religious communities, worshipping as they see fit, freely associating with one another, selling or distributing literature, proselytizing on the street, soliciting funds, or generally spreading the church's message among the population. It certainly does not compel members of the church to perform acts at odds with the fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs." Another key issue was the connection between the fraud which brought Molko and Leal to Booneville Farm and the mind control, they were subj ected to in the ensuing months. Although they · admitted they knew the Churchls identity some months after they ; were deceptively inducted, both Molko and co-plaintiff Tracy Leal said the church's agents had rendered them incapable of deciding · not to join the church, by sub~ecting them, without their knowle~ge : or consent, to an lntense program of ~csr~3FPrl~~'a~n or mlnd control. / The California Supreme Court noted that the concept of coercive / persuasion was controversial, with some experts saying it was a myth, others saying that it is effective only when combined with physical abuse or physical restraint and still others saying it could be carried out without any force at all. The Court said that it did not have to decide the controversy at this stage. But the dispute over brainwashing theories created a factual dispute that demanded a resolution before the case could be dismissed at such an early stage. The fact that the U.S. Supreme Court refused to interfere with the California Court' s conclusions gives the case nationwide implications. 10 \Hendricks paper\Page.00013 The case, however, never went to trial. The church settled with Molko. Thus, a major opportunity was missed for establishing the degree to which the Unification Church's recruitment and induction process constituted "brainwashing." ust\~ as the Molko case followed the lines of traditional tort cases., its settlement prior to resolution of major issues also was typical. In many personal injury cases against such organiz-dtions as cigarette makers and automobile manufacturers, plaintiffs agree to settle prior to jury trials. This enables plaintiffs to collect compensatory damages more quickly and avoid the stress of a 1 prolonged public trial. It allows the defendant organization to avoid negative publicity, save on litigation costs and, at times, i seal potentially embarrassing documents from public scrutiny. In 1 the area of cult litigation, the Church of Scientology has been i particularly successful at using settlements and secrecy agreements · not only to seal material that was previously part of the public record, but also to bar individuals from serving as witnesses in · future cases. A major reason these settlements are c\dr~onplace is that it is the i duty of the plaintiff's attorney to repr~Sent the plaintiff's best · interests. The attorney is not supposed to ~gnsider primarily the overall impact of the case, or to use his br her client as a i springboard for setting public policy. i Unfortunately v'; the failure to judge definitely the threats to public healUi and safety posed by defective automobiles or by an 1 organization's fraudulent recruiting practices continues by default the absence of public policy, possibly exposing individuals to a '~ repeat of the same harms previously litigated. Nonetheless, the significance of the Molko case could not be underestimated. i For the first time, a court had held that the fraud-induced recruitment into a religious organization and the subsequent process of indoctrination does not fall in the category of a "belief," (which is absolutely protected under the First Amendment), but instead into the category of "conduct," which can be regulated by the court. While the church's goal certainly was to persuade Molko to accept its beliefs, its officials, in pursuing this goal, in fact participated in conduct that fell within the court ' s jurisdiction fraud , undue inf luence / coerc ive persuasion). Another important lesson was that coercive persuasion could occur without physical coercion. Moreover, Molko created a model for evaluating a civil litigant's experiences with a cult/new religion. The first prong of that model is the fact that the individual's participation with the cult LJn , 11 \Hendricks paper\Page.00014 was induceb_through fraud,lCd-efined as (1) a representation, (2) known to be falSe,- -(~3'T-r~3n~de~ with_~h~--intent to defraud and induce '~e.. indiv-idual justifiably relied on the individual's reliance~A3 the misrepresentation~)-CS) which caused him to participate and (6) damages resulted. subj second prong: once a part of the group, the person was ected to undue influence through a set of specific and identifiable techniques which have as their ultimate goal the inculcation of the person with the beliefs of the organization. Those techniques can include, but are not limited to, (1) isolation, (2) manipulation of time and attention, (3) positive and negative reinforcement, (4) peer group pressure, (5) prohibition of dissent (6) deprivation of sleep and protein and the (7) inducement of fear, guilt and emotional dependency. In being fraudulently induced into an organization, and subjected to undue inf luence , the individual is also the victim of the intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, the third prong of the model. A central theory of this model is the inverse relation between accurate information and the individual's capacity to make judgments. This goes to the vital issue of informed consent. For the two necessary elements of informed consent are (1) tne mental capacity to make judgments, and (2) reliable information enabling ak~y~jc~tqmerr~ be Inform_e~f~. As Delgado predicted) andthe Molko Court affirmed, when the individual first comes in contact with the cult, his or her "capacity" is high. At that point, the individual is given misleading and/or incomplete information about the group that is designed to induce his reliance so he will place himself unwittingly in an atmosphere of coercive persuasion. Then the person is subjected to specific techniques designed to undermine his ability to reason, and reduce his capacity to exercise an informed consent. Thus, the longer the individual stays in the group, and learns more about its true nature and objectives, the less that individual is capable of evaluating the impact of the group's practices on himself, according to the theory. This can result is an obedient follower who adopts the group's belief as his own. The model describes an inextricably linked chain of cause-and- effect: fraud leading to undue influence and coercive persuasion, resulting in the infliction of emotion distress. The process is made possible because the individual is not adequately informed about the organization from the outset. As the California Supreme Court stated in Molko: Brainwashing is fostered through the creation of a 12 \Hendricks paper\Page.00015 controlled environment that heightens the susceptibility of a subject to suggestion and manipulation through sensory deprivation, physiological depletion, cognitive dissonance, peer pressure, and clear assertion of authority and dominion. The aftermath of indoctrination is a severe impairment of autonomy and of the ability to think independently, which induces a subject's unyielding compliance and the rupture of past connections, affiliations and associations~2i As we see, the Molko Model applies with varying degrees to three other major cases involving new religions. The Wollersheim Case The case of Wollersheim v. Church of Scientolosv Intl.' has been accepted for review by the California Supreme Court. - It's not clear if it will review the appellate court's decision in its entirety, or only selected portions. Until the Supreme Court rules, the appellate court's opinion in Wollersheim provides an in-depth analysis of the restraints that courts can place upon new religions. In particular, it found that Wollersheim had been subjected to a high level of coercion, in the context of Scientology's notorious "Fair Game" policy, and that it added up to tortious conduct. A close look at the facts in Wollersheim is vital to understanding the Appellate Court's decision on issues of tortious conduct by the Church of Scientology, of possible standards for judging whether "undue influence" occurs and of what damages are appropriate. The trial judge dismissed Wollersheim's fraud claims, making it appear that the "Molko Model" of (1) fraud, leading to (2) undue influence, leading to intentional infliction of emotional distress, 1 did not apply. However, it's important to note that the trial judge dismissed the fraud claims prior to the California Supreme Court's decision in Molko. Thus, it is not yet known how a California court, with Molko as governing precedent, would rule on fraud issues when confronted with a similar set of facts. What is faithful to the Molko Model was Wollersheim's experience of only being provided limited information about what was really in store for him. For if Wollersheim knew from the outset that he would become the victim of harassment, one could postulate that he would have chosen not to associate with Scientology. 21 Molko, op, cit. Wollersheim v. Church of Scientolosv, op. cit. 13 \Hendricks paper\Page.00016 Wollersheim's agonizing deterioration also fits within the model. His capacity to make independent decisions plummeted in relation to his harsh treatment at the hands of Scientology officials -- to the point that he was considered a "basket case." Despite the dismissal of the fraud claim, a jury awarded him $30 million for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress -- $5 million in compensatory damages and $25 million in punitive damages. On appeal, the appellate court summarized the facts in the case. ~Pt~tIAd that Wollersheim was an "incipient manic-depressive," a fact of which Scientology officials were aware. He started taking courses in 1969, and spent the 1970s "auditing" his way to "higher" levels of Scientology. Auditing is the one-on-one interviewing process in which the individual answers questions about his or her past. In the trial, at the "law and motion stage," the court ruled that Scientology was a religion, and later instructed the jury accordingly. Similarly, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial judge's finding that "'Auditing' is a constitutionally protected religious practice where it is conducted in a non-coercive environment." However, the court, without passing judgment on all auditing experiences, concluded that the environment in which Wollersheim ultimately was audited was extremely coercive. His troubles began when he was assigned to the Rehabilitation Project Force (RPF), working long hours and taking auditing on a Scientology ship. Working and sleeping conditions were harsh to the point that Wollersheim, after losing 15 pounds, decided he wanted to leave the ship because he "was dying and losing [his] mind." But Scientology officials "held him captive" until he agreed to remain and continue with the auditing and other religious practices taking place on the ship, the court said. The Court found as significant the coercive manner in which Wollersheim remained on the ship, continuing auditing as well as other practices that were contributing to his emotional distress. Adding to this distress upon his departure was the steep "Freeloader debt" which Scientology officials claimed he owed for all of the auditing. A final blow to his mental state was dealt when Scientology officials ordered other Scientologists to boycott Wollersheim's photography business, including nonpayment of outstanding bills. This latter attack was part of Scientology's notorious "Fair Game" policy, which holds that anyone declared "suppressive" (i.e. an enemy of Scientology) "may be deprived of property or injured by any means by a Scientologist [and] may be tricked, sued or lied to or destroyed." 14 \Hendricks paper\Page.00017 The Court found that the threatened sanctions of "Fair Game," and "Freeloader Debt," coupled with the physical restraint that resulted from being aboard the ship, amounted to a serious level of coercion. It also ~f~ the church for revealing supposedly confidential information that Wollersheim provided during auditing, and using it against him in "Fair Game" attacks. "The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress was created to punish conduct 'exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by a decent society, of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause mental distress," the Court said. "Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant 1) abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interest; 2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or 3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress."' The ~ppellate/ court compared Scientology's campaign against Wolleri~eim tb "The Inquisition," involving torture and execution, which th\e C~h~ristians conducted centuries ago in Europe. Just as American ~durts assuredly would find that the Inquisition was not protected~ \t3y the First Amendment, the appe 1 late court said Scientorbgy's~anti-Wollersheim vendetta fell within the scope of conduct which courts could prohibit. "[No case] even implies a religion is entitled to constitutional protection for a campaign deliberately designed to financially ruin anyone. Nor have we found any cases suggesting the free exercise clause can justify a refusal to honor financial obligations the state considers binding and legally enforceable. One can only imagine the utter chaos that could overtake our economy if people who owed money to others were entitled to assert a freedom of religion defense to repayment of those debts. It is not unlikely the courts would soon be flooded with debtors who claimed their religion prohibited them from paying money they owed to others." "The evidence established Wollersheim was coerced into remaining a member of Scientology and continuing with the auditing process. constitutional guarantees of religious freedom do not shield such conduct from civil liability. We hold the state has a compelling interest in allowing its citizens to recover for serious emotional injuries they suffer through religious practices they are coerced into accepting. Such conduct is too outrageous to be protected under the constitution and too unworthy to be privileged under the law of torts." 23 See Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Ca.3d at pg. 946 15 \Hendricks paper\Page.00018 Despite the harsh judgment or Scientology's treatment of Wollersheim, the appellate court reduced the $30 million judgment to $2.5 million. It based the reduction on the finding that the Church of Scientology's net worth was $16 million and that Wollersheim's "psychological injury, although permanent and severe is not totally disabling." It added: "Even Wollersheim admits Scientology's conduct only aggravated a pre-existing psychological condition; Scientology did not create the condition." The court's decision was well-grounded in the specific facts in Wollersheim's case and in traditional concepts of tort law. For the coercion imposed upon Wollersheim, it found, stemmed from the physical restraint coinciding with his presence on the ship, and on the easily identified economic threats arising from the freeloader debt and Fair Game, which directly contributed to the destruction of Wollersheim's photography business. Satisfied that it ~brought relief to Wollersheim, the court declined to delve further and address allegations that Scientology's routine auditing practices and "training routines" can have an undue influence over people. "By imposing liability in the instant case we in no way or degree prevent or inhibit Scientology from continuing the free exercise of the religious practice of auditing. Paraphrasing from the California Supreme Court's decision in Molko, it said, "At most, it potentially closes one questionable avenue for coercing members to remain in the church and to continue its core practices such as auditing." Greqory Mull & Church Universal And Triumohant Gregory Mull was a self-employed architect in San Francisco. He was self-supporting, paid his bills and owned his home. He had a lifelong interest in religion. In a 1973 bible study group he held at his home, he was introduced to the teachings of Elizabeth Clare Prophet, spiritual leader of CUT. Within a year of meeting Prophet, he became a follower, soliciting donations on behalf of CUT. In 1979, Prophet's invited him to move to "Camelot," which was CUT- owned property on which Mull believed $33 million -worth of buildings were to be constructed at the "New Jerusalem. " Believing that he had an agreement that CUT would cover his $3,000 per month financial obligations in San Francisco, Mull closed his architectural business and moved to Camelot. However, CUT failed to cover Mull's expenses in a timely fashion, and after ten months, ceased to pay them at all. Mull lost his credit and eventually sold his home. CUT insisted that any payments it had made to Mull were loans. When Mull left Camelot and withdrew from CUT, the church sued in California Superior Court for nonpayment of loans. Mull counter-sued, charging alleged assault, intentional infliction 16 \Hendricks paper\Page.00019 of emotional distress, fraud, breach of fiduciary relationship, and cancellation of instruments.' In the trial CUT attempts to defend many of it actions against Mull on its right to freedom of religion based upon the First Amendment. For instance, CUT asserted that the money Mull gave to it was in response to a Biblical injunction, and thus was based upon religious belief and could not be questioned by the court. It also tried to exclude on religious grounds evidence about a CUT chanting practice known as "decreeing." Mull's attorney, Lawrence Levy, consistently emphasized that the trial was not about the religious beliefs of Mull, CUT or anyone else. "I never questioned the belief system, and I asked the judge to instruct the jury that we were inquiring only into actions, in this case extortion, breach of confidence, etc.," Levy recalled. "If religious belief discussion was broached by CUT, I asked for a jury caution that beliefs were not an issue, only tortious conduct and its effects on [Mull]. I discussed religion once or twice, but only as it related to conduct. I did not even mention other noted cult cases, so great was my effort to show as starkly as possible that were alleging only the commission of garden-variety torts."' Levy's main strategy was to demonstrate Prophet's "undue influence" over Mull. Over the years, Prophet and Mull had developed a business and spiritual relationship, as well as a personal friendship. When things turned sour, and the 58 year-old Mull was about to depart Camelot, Prophet and other CUT officials called him in for a two and one half hour meeting (which was taped) in which Prophet finally convinced him to donate $5,489 of his last $5,500 in the bank. Levy' s account of the incident showed where the line between religious belief and religious practice could be drawn: "I argued that money given by a member to CUT after a two and one-half hour ritual browbeating -- 'decreeing' -- is not protected, and cannot be called a 'donation.' [Mull] testified, quite rightly, that the decreeing, which threatens supernatural sanctions, frightened him into giving the money. But I never questioned the belief system. "26 24 Church Universal & Triumphant, Inc. and Elizabeth Clare Proohet v. Linda witt. Executrix etc.: Court of Appeal, 2nd App. Dist., Div. Five, (Unpublished); Sup. ct. Slip Op. No. C358191 2S Levyi Lawrence, Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 7 No. 1, 1990, pg. 18 Ibid 17 \Hendricks paper\Page.00020 In making the case for "undue influence, " Levy advised other attorneys, he did not use the term "brainwashing." "To uninformed judges and juries, the word connotes processes found in Chinese prison camps during the Korean War. The defense will point out that cult life is different, and if you insist on using the term you may well lose your argument about undue influence and coercive manipulation. Whenever CUT counsel brought up the term, implying that we were accusing CUT of brainwashing, I said that I never used the term and would never inquire into the inculcation of religious belief. Thus, we denied CUT's attempt to make 'brainwashing' an issue." ' The strategy worked in this case. The jury awarded $1,563,000, more than $1 million of which was punitive damages. Levy emphasizes that Mull never would have brought suit had he not been sued first. (Mull died before he could collect the judgment.) When CUT attempted to have the case overturned the California Court of Appeal for the Second District affirmed the jury verdict on most of the counts. In reviewing the appeals courts finding, we find that they fit squarely within the Molko Mode 1. First, it found that Mull suffered damages due to the conduct of Prophet and certain CUT officials, not to any belief system. Second, it was misrepresentations and fraudulent statements that induced Mull to give up his life in San Francisco and move to the CUT complex. Third, he was subjected to undue influence, intentional infliction of emotional distress and breaches of fiduciary duty while living under the rule of CUT. Consequently, his capacity to make independent judgments lessened dramatically the longer he lived under the CUT roof. The appeals court rejected CUT's religious defense, citing the Molko Court's determination that "While religious belief is absolutely protected, religiously motivated conduct is not."28 Specifically, the appeals court said it was proper to have admitted evidence regarding the "highly structured atmosphere," at CUT, including strict vegetarian diet, frequent fasting, us of enemas and 'colonics,' long hours of chanting ("decreeing") followed by lectures on doctrine, sleep deprivation, isolation from family and friends, fear of CUT, and the need for counseling after withdrawing from membership. It also approved the admission of testimony about the lengthy chanting known as "decreeing." According to Randall King, n Ibid, pg. 20 CUT v. witt, op. cit. 18 \Hendricks paper\Page.00021 Prophet's former husband and ex-CUT official, decreeing was used for many purposes -- to support friends and attack enemies. One time CUT members circled hospitals and decreed for or against the subject inside.' King testified that he thought decreeing could be dangerous because the activity could lead to a "kind of hypnotic state where you are supersuggestible." He also stated that "some decrees involved shouts, hand signals and vitriolic language directed at organizations or persons (which could include former members) thought to oppose CUT."' The court concluded the testimony "was relevant and not unduly prejudicial." It affirmed the jury's verdict on various tort claims. The appeals panel concluded that in the fateful two and one-half hour final meeting Prophet "used her influence" to take his last $5,000 in savings in a manner that intentionally inflicted emotional distress. It agreed that CUT committed fraud when if offered provide for Mull's "necessities of life," including "expenses," in exchange for his contribution of money and labor. "These, as well as other representations, were made with the knowledge that appellants did not intend to provide things represented. Thus, the element of misrepresentation was pleaded without reference to religious belief," the court said.3' The court also found that CUT and Prophet improperly divulged data that were supposed to be confidential. Mull, like other CUT parishioners, had to write a "clearance letter" describing all past sins. Only those sins fully recorded would be forgiven. The letter was to be read solely by Prophet in a special ceremony and burned immediately thereafter. Mull wrote an extensive, 10-page letter describing his sex life, including homosexual encounters he had experienced as a young man. Other than this, he did not discuss his sex life with anyone else at CUT, the court found. However, when Mull spoke to a religious group in Montana, "a CUT member stood up and shouted that Mull was an impotent homosexual who hated Prophet and whose business partner had run off and married Mull's ex-wife."' " Ibid, pg. 18 Ibid " Ibid, pg. 24 " Ibid, pg. 23 19 \Hendricks paper\Page.00022 The court found the above-described "public disclosure of private facts" constituted a "breach of fiduciary relationship."' In conclusion, the court said, "The punitive damages awarded here were not excessive in view of the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages. The reprehensibility of the acts of [CUT and Prophet], in light of the whole record, also supports the award." "Finally, the wealth of appellants is to be considered since the purpose of punitive damages is to punish wrongdoers and thereby deter the commission of wrongful acts. Evidence was received regarding CUT's vast holdings of land and Mrs. Prophet's receipt of valuable gifts and other assets," it said.' The Robin Geor~e Case The case of Robin George involves successful efforts by various Hare Krishna temp 1 es to conceal the young 1 5 -y ear - o ld ' s whereabouts from her parents after she ran away from home. At one point, Temple officials told Mr. and Mrs. George that if they did not leave the Krishnas alone, they would "blow up their car," and "might not see Robin alive again." In the course of trying to locate her daughter Robin, Marcia George directly informed leaders of Krishna Temples that her husband was diagnosed with a heart condition and that the search for Robin was significantly adding to his stress. However, Krishna leaders, claiming to honor Robin's desires, shuttled her from Temple to Temple, disguised her so ultimately she could flee to Canada, and continued to lie to Mrs. George about her whereabouts. The combination of police pressure and a publicity campaign by the Georges eventually persuaded Krishna leaders to return her to California. According to court documents, when a Krishna attorney instructed Robin to lie to police about the circumstances of indoctrination, she fled and eventually returned home. Some three months later, Robin's father suffered a heart attack, followed by several strokes. He died shortly thereafter. An expert subsequently testified that two years of anxiety over his daughter aggravated his heart condition and caused him an early death. Ibid Ibid, pg. 31 20 \Hendricks paper\Page.00023 At the eve of a press conference held by the Marcia and Robin George with the citizens Freedom Foundation, a Krishna leader released an "Official Position" stating, "Robin came to our temple and complained of being beaten by [her parents]. Once she told us that they had chained or teid [sic] her to her bed, and that they had forced a piece of hose down her throat to stop her chanting and singing. In October 1977, Robin and Marcia George sued the International Society of Krishna consciousness of california for intentional infliction of emotional distress to both, libel to both, while Robin sued singularly for the wrongful death of her father and false imprisonment. The jury found in favor of Robin and Marcia George on all charges and awarded them a total of $32.5 million in compensatory and punitive damages. The Georges accepted the trial judge's remittitur reducing both punitive and compensatory damages to a total of $7.9 million. A major part of the original sum was Robin's award for false imprisonment -- $1.5 in compensatory damages and $15 million in punitive damages. Because the charge of false imprisonment was intricately linked to charges of cult-induced "brainwashing," the jury and trial judge's finding on behalf of Robin George appeared to support a "tort theory of brainwashing." In trial, the Georges' attorneys recognized that Robin's was not a prototypical case of false imprisonment: She was not physically restrained by the Krishnas, she resided at various Temples at her own free will and, theoretically at least, was free to go at any time. However, the appeals court noted, "Robin's lawyers presented expert testimony from Drs. Margaret Singer and Sydney Smith to the effect Cthe Krishnas] had 'brainwashed Robin into joining the Krishna movement. "35 The appeals court continued: "In particular, Dr. Singer testified Robin's 'will had been overborne' by late October 1974 such that her decision to run away from home on November 16 was nota product of her own free will. Both Dr. Singer and Dr. Smith identified several features of the Krishna faith which, they argued, contributed to rendering Robin incapable of exercising freedom of George v. International Society for Krishna consciousness, 213 Cal. App. 3d 729 (1989) [decertified] 21 \Hendricks paper\Page.00024 choice including a "low-carbohydrate vegetarian diet, reduced amounts of sleep and chanting as a means of religious ritual."' This argument prompted the appeals court to examine in depth the lessons of Molko in terms of such issues as "brainwashing,l Icoercive persuasion" and false imprisonment. In general, the appeals court interpreted the California Supreme Court's ruling in Molko to mean that there can be no "brainwashing" claim, as connected to a false imprisonment claim, absent the use or threat of physical force. Yet the appeals court's opinion will have little or no practical effect because it was decertified by the State Supreme Court. (Decertification means that no California court may site the case as legal precedent, though other courts theoretically are free to do so.) Although the Supreme Court did not explain why it decertified the opinion, it is likely that it found the appeals court's view that there could be no thought reform/false imprisonment tort absent physical force in direct conflict with Molko. Although the opinion was decertified, the appeals court's discussion is worth examining, as it represents one school of thought on the issue and underlines the difficult task facing a trial attorney who seeks to show that his or her client was subjected to undue influence and other harm by a new religion. Noting that Molko's co-plaintiff Tracy Leal alleged false imprisonment, and attempted to support the charge by pointing to the Unification Church's threat that she would be "damned to Hell forever," it cited the Molko court's finding that Leal was trying "to make the Church liable for threatening divine retribution . [Such] threats are protected religious speech and cannot provide the basis for tort liability." We decline Robin's invitation to extend what we believe are the clear limits of Molko. To begin with, we read Molko as a reaffirmation that physical force or the threat of it is a necessary element of a false imprisonment cause of action even in the context of a brainwashing claim. The plaintiff's divine retribution argument was a last-ditch attempt to satisfy the threat requirement. We have great difficulty believing the Supreme Court simply ignored plaintiff's 'coercive persuasion' allegations as a possible basis for the force element. Robin is, of course, correct that the brainwashing theory expounded by Drs . Singer and Smith focused on more than threats of divine retribution. The results, however, are the same. Tort liability based on dietary restrictions, methods of worship and communal living arrangements and schedules is just 36 Ibid 22 \Hendricks paper\Page.00025 as surely inimical to the free exercise of religious liberty as that based on threats of divine retribution. This is made clear in another portion of the Molko opinion which defends against a First Amendment argument the court's conclusion that religious fraud is actionable: "Although fasting, poverty, silence or cloistered living may constitute intensive religious practice, we have already determined that fraud, even though purported to be religiously motivated, is actionable conduct . ,,37 Here, Robin presented no evidence of fraud as to her nor did the evidence at trial so much as suggest that the schedules, practices and duties required of her differed from those of any other Krishna devotee. Absent such evidence, Robin's brainwashing theory of false imprisonment is no more than an attempt to premise tort liability on religious practices the Georges find objectionable. Such a result is simply inconsistent with the First Amendment. Although the appeals court rejected the theory of brainwashing/false imprisonment in Robin's case, it indicated such a theory might succeed in future cases. In a footnote, the court said, "A different question might be presented if it could be shown that a religious group adopted certain devotional practices for the ourpose of brainwashing potential converts. No such evidence was presented in this case and we decline to express any opinion on the matter." Under the standard set forth in this footnote, to establish that a group adopted devotional practices for the purpose of brainwashing one presumably must demonstrate either internal documents in which the organization confirms that brainwashing is its purpose, or a witness who can testify to hearing high-level organizational officials state that their goal was brainwashing, or a pattern of activity that any reasonable person would conclude was designed to brainwash the subjects. The appeals court overturned the finding that Krishna intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon Robin. It said Robin's arduous and unpleasant life as a Krishna was not different from that experienced by other Krishnas and was "hardly uncommon among cloistered religious groups." It said Robin had not established there had been fraud, as in Molko, or force or coercion, as in Wollersheim. In a footnote, the appeals court explained. 37 Ibid 23 \Hendricks paper\Page.00026 It should be noted that plaintiffs' use of the word "forced" on several occasions . . . are clearly characteriza- tions rather than objective statement of fact. Although she was instructed to do certain things by her superiors in the Krishna faith, there is no evidence Robin was ever threatened with physical force if she failed to comply. Apart from the metaphysical question of brainwashing, there was every objective indication that Robin actively sought [Krishnas'~ assistance and fully cooperated in their efforts to hide from her parents." The appeals court said Robin could find no solace in Wollersheim, in which the court held "that where a church member's participation was i nvo luntary in the sense that it was coerced by force and threats, the religious nature of the activities would not insulate a church from an otherwise proper claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress." "Here, as we have emphasized, there was simply no physical force used. Neither was there evidence of threats of economic sanctions. The extent Wollersheim can be read as expanding Molko beyond the strict fraud context, that expansion is nonetheless inapplicable on the facts of this case," the appeals court said. The only cause of action for which the appeals panel permitted Robin to recover was the wrongful death of her father. When Marcia George warned a Krishna official of her husband's weak heart, and the stress caused by Robin's disappearance, the official "snickered" and said another devotee's father had the same problem "but did not die from it." "In spite of defendants' knowledge of Jim George's weak heart, they persisted in conceal ing Robin' s whereabouts and subj ected the Georges to verbal and physical abuse," it said, in affirming the award of $75,000 to Robin. The court found that most actionable offenses were recoverable by Marcia, Robin's mother. It clearly found that the Krishnas intentionally inflicted emotional suffering. nFeigned ignorance was only one aspect of this reprehensible activity. The purchase of plane and bus tickets, disguises, fake photographs, fraudulent letters and arguably the libelous 'Official Position" news release were all part and parcel of the conspiracy and provide a more than adequate basis for concluding that defendants engaged in outrageous conduct 'exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by a decent society," it said, affirming 38 Ibid 24 \Hendricks paper\Page.00027 $400,000 in compensatory damages and $2 million in punitive damages. 39 It rejected the Krishna's First Amendment defense that some of the jury award for Marcia was based upon protected activity. The damages were based not upon Robin's conversion to a new religion, but upon the Krishnas persuading her to leave home, it said. The court affirmed the libel judgment of $10,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages for the "Official Position," as it found no evidence of physical mistreatment, as alleged by the Krishnas, and it was "reasonably clear that the 'Official Position' was prepared without regard for accuracy and that defendants in fact entertained serious doubts as to [its] truth." The appeals court reduced Robin's award to $75,000 for the wrongful death count, and affirmed Marcia's award of $2.9 million for intentional infliction of emotional distress and libel. It also affirmed the order for a "conditional" new trial. At the time of this writing, attorneys for the Georges were negotiating with the Krishnas over a final settlement figure. In sum, the damages in the George case arose mainly from the effect that hiding Robin had upon her parents, particularly her father, who had a heart condition. Robin's only claim stemmed from the damage she suffered from her father's wrongful death. In hindsight, we can see that Robin did not meet the standards set forth in the Molko Model, at least as the case now stands under the decertified appeals court decision. First, she failed to establish that she was induced into joining the Krishnas through fraudulent misrepresentations. Second, she was unable to show that she was coerced into taking actions that she otherwise would not have taken, or that she was "overpersuaded" by undue influence. In other words, the court found she was not inducted by deceit and that her membership was not consolidated by the imposition of undue influence. EMERGING LES60N6 FROM LEADING CASEG 1) Religious belief is protected absolutely, but religiously- motivated conduct can be scrutinized by courts. Thus, religious organizations may not violate the rights of others and expect to hide behind the protections of the First Amendment. When it comes to tortious conduct, cults are subj ect to the same rules as everyone else. Ibid 25 \Hendricks paper\Page.00028 2) Critics and ex-members of new religions are not "fair game" who can be subjected to harassment, nonpayment of bills, "browbeating" or other undue influence. 3) Cults must allow members to come and go as they please. They may not attempt to prevent a member from leaving through threats of physical or economic harm, or other forms of coercion. 4) Religious organizations and their recruiters, upon request, must identify themselves and be open about their affiliation and goals. They may not commit fraud, either by concealing their true identity when they attempt to recruit new members, or promising services or results that they have no intention or capability of delivering or achieving. 5) Religious organizations must disclose to parents the whereabouts of their minor children. Attempts to conceal a child's identity could result in liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress, or worse, wrongful death. 6) Religious organizations or their leaders must protect the confidential communications of their members. Any disclosure of these confidential communications without first obtaining the member's consent is likely to result in liability for breach of fiduciary duty. 7) Religious organizations may not libel anyone. 8) If it is shown that a religious organization has developed devotional practices for the purpose of exerting undue influence over members, then that organization could incur major liability. E~ilosue While the primary purpose of this essay was to examine cases in which courts had rendered some form of decision, it is worth noting that a case pending in a Texas court features many of the issues described above. Moreover, the case of Vicki and Richard Aznaran v. Church of Scientoloqy of California, et al.40, could result in one of the first significant challenges to the church's legal status as a religion. Vicki Aznaran spent 15 years in Scientology and rose through the ranks to become president and inspector general of the Religious 40 Vicki and Richard Aznaran v. Church of Scientolosv. et al.: U.S. Dist. Ct. (Central Dist.) No. CV-88-1786-JMI; (transferred to court in Dallas, Texas.) 26 \Hendricks paper\Page.00029 Technology Center (RTC), a Scientology organization charged with "protecting the purity" of the writings of L. Ron Hubbard. Her husband Rick was also a high-ranking Scientology security official. They departed Scientology during the mid-1980s when, following the death of L. Ron Hubbard, a power struggle erupted. The $70 million lawsuit follows the Molko Model, charging fraud, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, invasion of privacy and false imprisonment. Initially filed in a Los Angeles federal court, the case recently was transferred to federal court in Dallas, Texas. That transfer order is being appealed. Represented by Ford Greene, the victorious California attorney in Molko, the Aznarans charge that Scientology defrauded them by promising services and personal betterment that they never delivered, and then by brainwashing them through various Scientology routines. The false imprisonment charges stems from Vicki's prolonged "stay" in Scientology's disciplinary camp known as the Rehabilitation Force Project (RFP). There she allegedly was ordered to run around a pole in the desert, day-in, day-out for three months under the watch of guards. The Church of Scientology California argued before U.S. District Judge James M. Ideman that the First Amendment barred the court from considering the Aznarans' charges because it would lead to unconstitutional judicial scrutiny of the Scientology's religious doctrine, belief and practices. However, on June 23, 1992 Judge Ideman rejected this claim, as well as other Scientology arguments, for dismissing the case early. Greene says Judge Ideman's rejection of the First Amendment defense clears the way for the Aznarans to challenge the Church of Scientology's religious status. This is particularly significant considering that in the four above-described cases, the plaintiffs were under a court ruling that the organization they were suing was a bona fide religion. COPYRIGHT @ 1992, E.D. Hendricks, Washington, D.C. ================================================================= If this is a copyrighted work, you are acknowledging by receipt of this document from FACTNet that on the basis of reasonable investigation, you have not been to obtain a copy elsewhere at a fair price, and that you are and will abide by the following copyright warning. 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